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A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACH
TO GUARDIANSHIP OF PERSONS WITH MILD
COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT
Patricia C. McManus ∗
Independent functioning is not simply the ability to do something, but also
the ability to decide what to do. It is not only the ability to take care of
oneself. It is also the ability to take responsibility for oneself. Autonomy
and independence do not grow out of being told what to do and when to
do it. It is only by having his needs considered, by becoming a participant
in the decision-making process, that a child develops the capacity for
1
autonomy.

American psychiatrist Elaine Heffner offered the preceding insight in the specific context of early childhood psychological
development. Her message, however, rings true for others—
specifically, adults with mild cognitive impairment. Persons with mild
cognitive impairment are a unique constituency, possessing various
2
abilities and special needs. These persons are often subject to
guardianship arrangements in which their autonomy is compromised
to protect their best interests. This Comment explores guardianship
proceedings and arrangements involving persons with mild cognitive
impairment through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, with the hope
that such an approach will ultimately increase autonomy in these arrangements.
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1
ELAINE HEFFNER, MOTHERING: HOW WOMEN CAN ENJOY A NEW RELATIONSHIP
WITH THEIR CHILDREN—AND A NEW IMAGE OF THEMSELVES 103 (Anchor Books 1980).
2
Mild cognitive impairment, also known as mild mental retardation, is a developmental disability that involves low intelligence test scores (also known as IQ
scores) and difficulty adapting to the demands of living. See discussion infra Part
III.B.
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3

Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) is a psycho-social-legal theory
4
that can meaningfully inform aspects of guardianship proceedings
5
and arrangements involving adults with mild cognitive impairments.
Applying TJ principles in this setting can enhance the accuracy of incompetency proceedings, increase wards’ participation and feelings
of control, and generate greater overall ward satisfaction with guardianship arrangements—thereby creating a unique opportunity for
6
autonomy-maximizing arrangements. As a legal theory, TJ emphasizes the impact of case law and legislation on participants in the legal
7
system, particularly in the context of mental health law. A TJ perspective seeks to understand how legal rules, procedures, and roles
8
influence and affect participants in the legal system. It is important
to determine the extent to which guardianship proceedings and arrangements incorporate therapeutic principles and allow for the
ward’s participation and feelings of control over life decisions, because participation and feelings of control are likely to positively
9
influence levels of satisfaction among wards. Ward participation and
attendant feelings of control create the potential for autonomymaximizing arrangements and can help to combat feelings of help3

TJ is defined as:
an interdisciplinary approach to law that builds on the basic insight
that law is a social force that has inevitable (if unintended) consequences for the mental health and psychological functioning of those
it affects. Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that these positive and
negative consequences be studied with the tools of the behavioral sciences, and that, consistent with considerations of justice and other
relevant normative values, law be reformed to minimize antitherapeutic consequences and to facilitate achievement of therapeutic
ones.
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 7 (Dennis P.
Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
4
Guardianship is defined as “the delegation, by the state, of authority over an
individual’s person or estate to another party.” GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND
LAWYERS 339 (2d ed. 1997).
5
See discussion infra Part III.B.
6
See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
7
See supra note 3.
8
See DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT 4 (1990).
9
Psychologists define personal control as a sense that one has a degree of control over their environment, as opposed to feeling helpless. DAVID G. MYERS,
PSYCHOLOGY: MYERS IN MODULES 539 (6th ed. 2001). Studies have shown that people
who believe that they can control their fate and destiny are more successful, independent, and healthy. See, e.g., Margie Lachman & Susan Weaver, The Sense of Control
as a Moderator of Social Class Differences in Health and Well-Being, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 763–73 (1998).

MCMANUS 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 4:29:05 PM

COMMENT

593

lessness and disengagement that can result in, among other things,
10
Further, research sugthe phenomenon of learned helplessness.
gests that when persons are actively involved in decision-making, they
11
are more likely to consider decisions fair and to comply with them.
This Comment will apply a TJ framework to understand how legal rules (actual laws), legal procedures (legal processes), and legal
roles (behaviors of legal actors such as judges, lawyers, guardians, and
wards) associated with guardianship proceedings and arrangements
influence the participation, feelings of control, levels of satisfaction,
and, ultimately, the personal autonomy of wards with mild cognitive
impairment. Part I of this Comment introduces the major tenets of
TJ. Part II examines contexts in which TJ has been applied, namely,
drug and mental health courts. Part III.A discusses the history of
guardianship and the current approaches to making guardianship
determinations. Part III.B then describes mild cognitive impairment
and guardianships involving persons with mild cognitive impairment.
Part IV discusses legal rules and procedures in this context while analyzing New York’s approaches to guardianship, concluding that the
functional and objective approach of New York’s Article 81 is superior to other approaches. Part V analyzes legal procedures and legal
roles, focusing on the effects of procedures and roles in both the
“front-end” and “back-end” of guardianship proceedings and arrangements. Part VI presents counterarguments to the TJ approach
in this context. Finally, Part VII concludes that the application of TJ
principles in this context can increase feelings of participation, control, and satisfaction and can help to create optimal outcomes for this
population.

10

Learned helplessness is a phenomenon in which persons and animals stop attempting to exert control over their environment because past attempts have proven
fruitless. MYERS, supra note 9, at 540. This result tends to lead to dissatisfaction and
stress. See, e.g., MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT,
AND DEATH (1975). Mentally disabled individuals experience paternalism in various
legal–as well as social–contexts and, as a group, are likely to develop feelings of helplessness and loss of control. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1990) (citing
“overprotective rules and policies” as one form of discrimination confronting disabled individuals).
11
Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for
Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 439–40 (1992).
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INTRODUCTION TO THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

Professor David B. Wexler has described TJ as “the study of the
12
use of the law to achieve therapeutic objectives.” Professor Wexler
and Professor Bruce J. Winick, the movement’s founders, have written extensively on the topic, applying its tenets in a number of mental
13
health law contexts. TJ considers the law (i.e., legal rules, legal procedures, and the functions of legal actors) as a social force that
14
shapes behaviors and outcomes. The law may have “therapeutic,”
15
healing, positive, and workable effects. On the other hand, the law
16
may produce “anti-therapeutic” or detrimental outcomes.
The TJ perspective also offers another important observation—
some laws that are intended to protect vulnerable persons may have
17
the unintended consequence of harming those persons. The potentially harmful effects of purportedly protective laws have been
explored in contexts outside of the guardianship realm. For example, Kay Kavanagh has considered the unintended impact of the
18
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy regarding homosexuality.
She states that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy is intended to integrate homosexuals into the military and also to protect them from
the long-held belief that “homosexuality is incompatible with military
19
service.” The author concludes, however, that the policy does more
harm than good for homosexual members of the military, because
required nondisclosure of sexual orientation may leave them feeling
20
socially isolated and marginalized. This is because sexual orientation, homosexual or heterosexual, is significantly intertwined with
21
aspects of daily life. For example, under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
12

WEXLER, supra note 8, at 4.
See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health Law, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 17 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996)
[hereinafter LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY]; David B. Wexler, Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of the Outpatient Civil Commitment of Pregnant Substance Abusers, in LAW
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra, 145.
14
David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
125, 125 (2000).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See Kay Kavanagh, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 142, 143 (1995).
19
Id. at 144 (citation omitted).
20
Id. at 151–53.
21
Id. at 153.
13
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policy, homosexuals in the military are precluded from discussing
22
topics that may divulge their homosexual status. Thus, the policy
forecloses the possibility of discussions about many aspects of one’s
personal life, including discussions about with whom one lives,
23
spends time, and celebrates important occasions. The requirement
of nondisclosure therefore has an anti-therapeutic, chilling function
24
that does not effectuate positive or beneficial outcomes.
The potential for the law to have anti-therapeutic outcomes has
25
also been observed in the disability setting. Some argue that the
confidentiality provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
can have the unintended and detrimental consequence of creating a
26
secretive, less effective, and less integrated work environment. The
ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a disabled
employee by failing to make reasonable accommodations for the em27
ployee’s disability. The confidentiality provision—in the context of
a request for a reasonable workplace accommodation—enables the
disabled worker to reveal his or her disability to the employer or su28
pervisor, but not to co-workers. This confidentiality provision, while
intended to protect the employee from discrimination by co-workers,
can create an environment of misunderstanding and inefficiency because co-workers are unable to participate in the integration of the
29
Conversely, the participation of co-workers will
disabled worker.
likely decrease speculation about the disabled worker and any attendant accommodations and can create a work environment in which
the disabled employee can most effectively benefit from the knowl30
edge and experience of co-workers.
The same concept may be applied in the context of guardianship. A legal system (i.e., legal rules, procedures, and roles) fails to
offer the appropriate protections and functions of guardianship
when it neither promotes the participation of wards, when appropriate, nor attempts to create autonomy-maximizing arrangements
22

Id. at 146.
Id. at 154.
24
See Kavanagh, supra note 18, at 143.
25
Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-worker Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89, 90–91 (1993–94).
26
Id.
27
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (1993).
28
Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i) (allowing disclosure of information pertaining to restrictions on job duties and necessary accommodations).
29
Daly-Rooney, supra note 25, at 92.
30
Id. at 93.
23
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31

among guardians and wards. Because mildly cognitively impaired
persons are particularly capable of assuming an active role in decisions about their person and property, a legal system that
disenfranchises this group will not produce optimal outcomes and
may have the unintended consequence of promoting disengagement
32
among wards.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES
IN OTHER AREAS: DRUG COURTS AND MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
The tenets of TJ have been applied in both criminal and civil
contexts. A brief overview will demonstrate the goals and practical
applications of the perspective while providing a framework for understanding the appropriate application of TJ in the civil
guardianship context.
Principles of TJ have long been applied in the criminal arena.
Myriad scholarly works have applied tenets of TJ to a range of crimi33
34
35
nal matters, including domestic violence, juvenile delinquency,
36
and most notably, substance abuse. Regarding the latter, much of
37
the literature focuses on drug courts.
Drug courts were developed under the premise that combining
rehabilitative and treatment goals with the traditional goals of retribution and deterrence can reduce subsequent drug abuse and lower
38
recidivism rates amongst offenders. In order to effectuate this goal,
the drug court model places new duties on judges, requiring them to
39
assume a more active role in the proceedings. While common law
31

See infra Part IV for a discussion of the guardianship reform movement and its
goal of preserving autonomy in guardianship arrangements.
32
See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
33
See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 14, at 131–34.
34
See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence
Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 33–35 (2000).
35
See, e.g., Georgia Zara, Essay, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as an Integrative Approach
to Understanding the Socio-psychological Reality of Young Offenders, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 127,
128 (2002); Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Court in Massachusetts: Issues of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY,
supra note 13, at 113, 113–14.
36
See, e.g., John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for
Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 930 (2000).
37
See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT (2001) for a thorough introduction to the literature in this area.
38
Candace McCoy, Community Courts and Community Justice: Commentary: The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2003) (citing rehabilitation and efficiency, as well as
economics, as goals of the drug court model).
39
Goldkamp, supra note 36, at 930.
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(as opposed to civil law) judges typically exemplify detachment, pas40
sivity, and restraint in the adjudicative process, judges in drug courts
become actively involved in the process “in a manner more like pro41
active therapists than dispassionate judicial officers.”
Further,
42
attorneys assume a less significant role in the drug court. This reconfiguration of traditional criminal procedural and substantive law
is intended to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and therapeutic out43
comes. Drug court judges have acknowledged that the traditional
criminal justice system can have anti-therapeutic consequences and
that the philosophy behind drug courts can encourage long-term so44
lutions to problems of drug abuse and addiction.
Some research findings demonstrate the effectiveness of drug
45
courts and the value of implementing a TJ model. One comprehensive study concluded that drug courts reduce drug use and
recidivism rates, and lessen the direct and indirect costs of dealing
46
with drug-related crime. Drug courts’ success can be attributed to
47
long-term offender engagement, as well as a therapeutic methodol48
ogy that attempts to treat the underlying problem.
Like drug courts, mental health courts apply TJ principles to
maximize positive outcomes in the mental health setting. Similar to
drug courts, mental health courts emphasize treatment for those who
become involved in the criminal justice system due to mental health
49
issues. The mental health court model is cooperative and primarily

40

NOLAN, supra note 37, at 92.
Id. at 40.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 58–60.
44
Id. at 50 (citing Judges Peggy Hora and William Schma, who argue that the
traditional criminal justice response to drug abuse and addiction keeps offenders in
denial because it does not encourage them to accept responsibility for their actions
or to sufficiently realize the impact of their drug abuse, and because it lowers their
self-esteem).
45
See, e.g., Steven Belenko, Ph.D., Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review 2001
Update, THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, June 2001, http://www.casacolumbia.org/absolutenm/articlefiles/
researchondrug.pdf.
46
Id.
47
JUDGE JEFF TAUBER & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, DUI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A
NATIONAL STRATEGY 4 (1999).
48
See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 37, at 34.
49
RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 850 (4th ed. 2004).
41
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50

non-adversarial. As with drug courts, the legal players take on new
roles; prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement personnel and
representatives of correctional and treatment facilities all collaborate
51
to create a positive, long-term result for the mentally ill offender.
At initial hearings in mental health courts, the judge will typically use expert testimony by mental health professionals to evaluate
52
the offender’s mental state and determine competency. Judges in
mental health courts may order necessary treatment for mentally ill
offenders and some jurisdictions have created “functional conditional
release plans” in which offenders are treated in the least restrictive
setting (usually in the community) and are closely monitored by the
53
mental health court. The mental health court’s emphasis on treating the underlying illness, the court’s intimate familiarity with issues
of mental illness, and its careful monitoring schemes function to facilitate the treatment of mentally ill offenders and their reintegration
54
into society. Such a system is consonant with the goals and objectives of TJ.
Drug and mental health courts apply therapeutic principles with
much success. By focusing on the helping or therapeutic aspects of
legal intervention in the lives of drug abusers and mentally ill offenders, these courts provide nuanced approaches to complicated
55
56
While not without their critics, such courts and the
problems.
theories they embrace tend to minimize anti-therapeutic and unin57
tended consequences of the legal system.
The success of these
specialty courts counsels for applying the principles of TJ in other settings, such as guardianship.

50

LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in
the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 291
(2001).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 292–93.
53
Id. at 298–302.
54
Id. at 322.
55
NOLAN, supra note 37, at 50.
56
See, e.g., Judge Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, NeoRehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2072 (2002) (arguing that the TJ movement and
courts that implement its principles, including drug courts, are both ineffective and
dangerous because among other things, legal actors are unfit to devise therapeutic
outcomes). See discussion infra Part VI.
57
NOLAN, supra note 37, at 50.
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III. GUARDIANSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF INDIVIDUALS WITH
MILD COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT
A. Introduction to Guardianship
Guardianship is the “delegation, by the state, of authority over
58
an individual’s person or estate to another party.” Guardianship has
ancient origins in Roman and English common law, under which the
sovereign had the power to safeguard the property of incompetent
59
persons. This power was derived from the state’s interest in its own
60
wealth preservation, and is the basis of the state’s parens patriae au61
thority. The appointment of a guardian is typically contemplated
when persons are unable to appropriately care for themselves or
when they are unable to manage their property or assets.
The determination of incompetency/incapacity and the process
of appointing a guardian comprise what is known as the “front-end”
62
63
of guardianship and will be discussed in more detail. Presently,
there are three main statutory approaches to making a guardianship
64
determination. The first approach considers whether the individual
65
is capable of taking proper care of himself or his property. State
statutes that use this approach also tend to emphasize the ability (or
lack thereof) to provide for a family, and to fend off predatory behav66
ior. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) provides another approach
67
to determine if guardianship is appropriate. State legislatures have
incorporated “[t]he operative wording for incapacity in UPC statutes,” which is “the lack of ‘sufficient understanding or capacity to
58

MELTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 339.
Id.
60
The definition of parens patriae is “[t]he state regarded as a sovereign; the state
in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
61
MELTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 339.
62
Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability Then and Now: Tracing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 STETSON L. REV. 867, 867 (2002).
63
See discussion infra Part V.A.
64
Phillip B. Tor, Ph.D. & Bruce D. Sales, J.D., Ph.D., A Social Science Perspective on
the Law of Guardianship: Directions for Improving the Process and Practice, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
65
Id. at 4–5. This approach provides vague standards for incompetency that can
result in inaccurate assessments of competency as well as disparate adjudications of
similarly situated persons. Id. at 5.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 6 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-103 (Supp. 1993)). This approach is
arguably more progressive than the first approach, but it still suffers from vagueness
and does not allow for a full functional assessment. Id. at 6–7.
59
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make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his per68
The third approach is known as the functional approach,
son.’”
and statutes drafted using this approach tend to emphasize the re69
sults or effects of specific impairments or limitations. Such statutes
include references to the likelihood of imminent harm due to cogni70
New York guardianship law, for
zable events or occurrences.
example, exemplifies the functional approach to guardianship de71
terminations. The statute provides that in reaching a determination
of incapacity, “the court shall give primary consideration to the func72
tional level and functional limitations of the person.” This includes
consideration of factors such as “management of the activities of daily
living” and an “understanding and appreciation of the nature and
consequences of any inability to manage the activities of daily
73
living . . . .” This Comment will discuss the functional approach in
74
more detail.
There are a variety of guardianship arrangements. In some jurisdictions, a guardian may be appointed over the ward’s “person” or
75
over the ward’s estate, or both. A guardian of the ward’s person has
authority over health and medical decisions, while a guardian of the
ward’s estate has authority over various aspects of the ward’s property,
76
including decisions to sell property. The latter form of guardian is
77
Further distinctions exist in which
typically called a conservator.
78
some jurisdictions restrict guardians’ powers to specific decisions.
This so-called specific, as opposed to plenary or general form of guardianship, is intended to allow for the guardian’s intervention only when
necessary, such as when the ward must make a novel or complicated
79
decision.

68

Tor & Sales, supra note 64, at 6 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-103(7) (Supp.
1993)); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-101 (2003). The Montana statute is illustrative of the UPC approach, as Montana has adopted the UPC in its entirety.
69
Tor & Sales, supra note 64, at 7.
70
Id. at 7–8. The functional approach is the most progressive approach to determining incapacity and is likely to lead to the most objective and accurate
assessments of competency. Id. at 9.
71
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 1996).
72
Id. § 81.02(c) (emphasis added).
73
Id.
74
See discussion infra Part IV.
75
MELTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 339.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
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Once appointed, a guardian has the power to make decisions for
the ward, subject to the limitation that the guardian acts only in the
80
“best interests” of the ward. Thus, the guardian and the ward are in
a fiduciary relationship that requires the guardian to act with loyalty
81
and care in dealings concerning the ward.
B. Guardianship and Individuals with Mild Cognitive Impairment
This Comment focuses on guardianship arrangements and proceedings that involve adults with mild cognitive impairment. This
class of persons is unique due to their abilities to learn academic skills
82
up to a sixth-grade level, to develop sophisticated communication
83
84
skills, and to develop socially desirable behaviors. While persons
with a mild degree of cognitive impairment may seem to be least in
need of any intervention, many persons with mild cognitive impairment may find themselves in need of some form of guardianship
arrangement in order to best care for themselves and their prop85
erty.
Mild cognitive impairment, also known as mild mental
86
retardation, is a developmental disability that involves low intelligence test scores (also known as IQ scores) and difficulty adapting to
87
the demands of living. Persons with cognitive impairment tend to
80

Id. at 344.
See generally Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician
Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 243
(1995) (“[F]iduciary relationships include guardians to wards, lawyers to clients, corporate officers and directors to shareholders, government officials to the public, and
financial advisors, brokers, and money managers to clients.”).
82
See discussion infra Part III.B.
83
See discussion infra Part III.B.
84
See discussion infra Part III.B.
85
Guardianship arrangements may be necessary depending on the degree of impairment of social skills and impairment in the areas of self-care and communication.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
86
This Comment uses the terms “cognitive impairment” and “mental retardation” interchangeably. Recently, the vernacular associated with issues of intellectual
impairment has shifted to what many conceive to be the more sensitive and appropriate terminology of “impairment” rather than “retardation,” but the term mental
retardation is still widely used. See generally The Life Span Institute, Research and
Training Center on Independent Living, Guidelines for Reporting and Writing
about People with Disabilities, http://www.lsi.ku.edu/lsi/internal/guidelines.html
(last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
87
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Research indicates that
the causes of mild cognitive impairment may be categorized as follows: (1) genetic
problems, such as Down syndrome or Fragile X syndrome; (2) problems during
pregnancy, such as maternal alcohol or drug use; (3) problems at birth, such as temporary oxygen deprivation; (4) diseases in early childhood, such as measles and
chicken pox that can lead to meningitis and encephalitis; and (5) malnutrition. The
81
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have some degree of impairment of social skills as well as problems
88
functioning in other areas, such as self-care and communication.
Of all persons with cognitive impairment, eighty-five percent are clas89
sified as mildly cognitively impaired. Intelligence test scores that fall
90
below a score of seventy evidence mild mental retardation; specifically, scores in the range of fifty to seventy are indicative of mild
91
mental retardation.
The vast majority of persons with cognitive impairment tend to
92
have a mild form of such impairment. Just as it is difficult to speak
generally about the abilities of persons with average intelligence, it is
also difficult to speak generally about the abilities of persons with
mild cognitive impairment. Even in this relatively narrow category of
93
persons, a range of propensities and aptitudes exist. For example,
persons closer to the high-end of the category (those with IQ scores
of approximately seventy) may differ in significant ways from those at
the low-end of the category (those with IQ scores of approximately
94
fifty).
While the abilities of those with mild cognitive impairment vary,
sometimes considerably, they may be generally classified to give a
framework for analysis. Generally, persons with mild cognitive im95
pairment can learn academic skills up to a sixth-grade level. This
means that persons in this category have many of the skills necessary
to meaningfully contribute and participate in important decisions
96
about themselves and their lives. For example, many mildly cogni-

Arc, Q&A: Causes and Prevention of Mental Retardation, http://www.thearc.org/
faqs/causesandprev.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
88
DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 41.
89
Id. at 43.
90
The average intelligence score on the most widely used intelligence test in the
United States is one hundred. MYERS, supra note 9, at 412. Sixty-eight percent of
persons who take this test fall within fifteen points (either above or below) of one
hundred. Id. Ninety-six percent of persons test within thirty points (either above or
below) of one hundred. Id. Thus, most of the population has an IQ of somewhere
between a score of seventy and a score of one hundred and thirty. Id. Scores of seventy and below indicate mental retardation. Id.
91
DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 42.
92
The other three levels or degrees of cognitive impairment are moderate, severe, and profound, with ten percent, three to four percent, and one to two percent
of the cognitively impaired population, respectively, falling into each category. DSMIV, supra note 87, at 43–44.
93
See discussion infra Part III.B.
94
See discussion infra Part III.B.
95
DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 43.
96
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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tively impaired persons are able to read and write by their late teens.
Frequently, they develop a level of sophisticated communication
98
skills. In fact, the Arc, a national organization dedicated to promoting and improving support for persons with cognitive impairment,
notes that persons with mild cognitive impairment possess skills that
make them competitive for various types of employment, including
99
numerous types of clerical and factory work. The abilities to read,
write, and communicate create a tremendous advantage for this
group and enable many persons with mild cognitive impairment to
understand the nature of their impairment and to effectively com100
municate their desires, needs, wishes, and preferences. This ability
is of the utmost relevance and importance to creating autonomy101
maximizing guardianship arrangements.
Further, because of the nature of their impairment, persons in
this category are frequently able to learn self-supportive and socially
102
desirable behaviors.
Additionally, they may have the ability to un103
These abilities
derstand and comprehend rules and directions.
often allow persons with mild cognitive impairment to live with minimal assistance, in either supportive living systems or small group
104
These abilities create the likelihood that persons who are
homes.
in need of some form of guardianship arrangement will be able to
105
maintain maximum levels of autonomy.
Guardianship arrangements and guardianship proceedings involving persons with mild cognitive impairment present a
phenomenon within the law in which principles of TJ may be applied
to effectuate optimally therapeutic outcomes. These principles, some
of which are demonstrated in the philosophies and practices of the

97

See DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 43 (discussing academic skills).
Id.
99
The Arc, Employment of People with Mental Retardation, http://www.thearc.
org/faqs/emqa.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
100
See Sigan L. Hartley & William E. MacLean, Jr., Perceptions of Stress and Coping
Strategies Among Adults with Mild Mental Retardation: Insight Into Psychological Distress,
110 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 285, 286 (2005) (discussing research that has shown
that persons with mild mental retardation can identify and describe the coping efforts they use to deal with stress).
101
See infra Part IV for a discussion of guardianship reform efforts that focus on
functional assessments in creating guardianship arrangements.
102
DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 43.
103
Id.
104
The Arc, Community Living, http://www.thearc.org/faqs/comliv.html (last
visited Jan. 8, 2006).
105
See discussion infra Part IV for a discussion of guardianship reform efforts that
focus on functional assessments in creating guardianship arrangements.
98
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106

specialty courts discussed above, can inform guardianship law both
procedurally and substantively. A careful and nuanced application of
TJ principles in this area can lead to arrangements that maximize
autonomous decision-making and minimize feelings of detachment
and helplessness.
IV. LEGAL RULES, OR ACTUAL LAWS, AND LEGAL
PROCEDURES, OR LEGAL PROCESSES
Guardianship statutes vary by state, but a common thread to
state guardianship statutes is the influence of guardianship reform
107
efforts.
The guardianship reform movement has indeed had influence, and perhaps the most important of which is an enhanced focus
108
on preserving autonomy in guardianship arrangements.
The legislative trend favoring increased autonomy in guardianship
arrangements involves changes in the definition of “incapacity” and
encouragement of limited guardianships, as well as improved assessment methods and enhanced procedural safeguards in guardianship
109
proceedings.
Efforts to change the definition of “incapacity” have
focused on defining incompetence or incapacity by way of objective
standards that focus on actual abilities, as opposed to labels or “mere
diagnosis” that place primary emphasis on a diagnosis or determina110
Limited guardianships are designed to
tion of mental retardation.
preserve individual autonomy by narrowly tailoring the guardianship
arrangement to meet the individual’s specific needs, and leaving
those areas that are within the individual’s competence to his or her
111
All of these trends, and the developments that they
discretion.
have spawned, are consistent with the goals of TJ in that they aim to
improve the impact of guardianship law on the lives of the persons
the laws affect.
The laws themselves, however, are only one part of the legal system, and, standing alone, they cannot improve the quality of life for
persons involved in guardianship arrangements. Judges, lawyers, legislators, guardians, and wards are all players in the legal system; each
player must do his or her part to bring about optimal outcomes in
the guardianship setting. Even in the age of guardianship reform,
106

See discussion supra Part II.
See Neil B. Posner, Comment, The End of Parens Patriae in New York: Guardianship Under the New Mental Hygiene Law Article 81, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 603, 607–10 (1996).
108
Id. at 607.
109
Id. at 607–10.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 609.
107
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the application of TJ principles—and the similar philosophies underlying the drug and mental health court movements—can improve
guardianship arrangements involving persons with mild cognitive
impairment.
An examination of New York’s guardianship statutes will illustrate both the law governing the process of making a determination
of incapacity and appointing a guardian (the “front-end”), and the
law governing guardian accountability and court monitoring of the
guardian (the “back-end”).
New York guardianship law is among the most progressive in the
112
nation due to its emphasis on functional, objective assessment. Despite having extremely progressive provisions governing the
appointment of a guardian for “persons with incapacities,” a different, arguably less progressive, set of laws governs the appointment of
guardians for persons with mental retardation or developmental dis113
Article 17-A of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act
abilities.
114
(SCPA) governs guardianships for persons with mental retardation
or developmental disabilities. Section 1750 of the SCPA states:
When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that a person is a mentally retarded person, the court is authorized to
appoint a guardian of the person or of the property or of both if
such appointment of a guardian or guardians is in the best inter115
est of the mentally retarded person.

More specifically, under section 1750, a court may appoint a
guardian upon certification that the individual is incapable of manag116
ing him or herself or affairs due to the mental retardation.
An
incapacity determination under Article 17-A appears to focus on the
label, or “mere diagnosis,” of mental retardation. Such an approach
differs significantly from an objective or functional evaluation, as

112

See id. at 618, 621.
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01, Practice Commentaries by Rose Mary Bailly
248, 250 (McKinney 1996).
114
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1750–61 (Consol. 2004).
115
Id. § 1750. The statute defines “mentally retarded person” as:
a person who has been certified by one licensed physician and one licensed psychologist, or by two licensed physicians at least one of whom
is familiar with or has professional knowledge in the care and treatment of persons with mental retardation, having qualifications to make
such certification, as being incapable to manage him or herself and/or
his or her affairs by reason of mental retardation and that such condition is permanent in nature or likely to continue indefinitely.
Id.
116
Id.
113
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seen in New York’s Mental Hygiene Law Article 81 which governs
proceedings for the appointment of a guardian for personal needs or
property management of incapacitated persons. Article 81 begins
118
with legislative findings and purposes; the statute immediately acknowledges the finding that persons with incapacities have varying
119
needs. Such a realization is simple yet profoundly important if persons with mild cognitive impairment are to be successful in
structuring guardianship arrangements that are most appropriate for
their individual needs. This section of the statute seeks to balance
maintaining individual autonomy with designing an adequately flexible guardianship regime capable of providing assistance to those in
120
The legislature states that conservatorships tend to be insufneed.
ficient to meet the needs of many persons with incapacities and that a
judicial committee’s findings of complete incompetence are often
121
The legislation acunnecessary for many persons with disabilities.
knowledges that many persons in need of some type of guardianship
arrangement will not require either of these “drastic remedies,” and
it adopts a “least restrictive form of intervention” standard designed
122
to allow for maximum autonomy.
Under Article 81, a court may appoint a guardian for an individual if the court “determines: 1. that the appointment is necessary to
provide for the personal needs of that person . . . and/or to manage
the property and financial affairs of that person; and 2. that the
person agrees to the appointment, or that the person is incapaci123
tated . . .” pursuant to the statute.
Under the statute, a determination of incapacity must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence, and the determination must demonstrate that:
(b) . . . a person is likely to suffer harm because:
1. the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or
property management; and

117

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01–81.44 (McKinney 1996).
Id. § 81.01.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. The legislature further states that the New York guardianship statute seeks
to establish a system “tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in
account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which affords the person the greatest amount of independence and self-determination and
participation in all the decisions affecting such person’s life.” Id.
123
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(1) (McKinney 1996). Personal needs include “food, clothing, shelter, health care, or safety . . . .” Id.
118

MCMANUS 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 4:29:05 PM

COMMENT

607

2. the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate
the nature and consequences of such inability.
(c) In reaching its determination, the court shall give primary
consideration to the functional level and functional limitations of
the person. Such consideration shall include an assessment of
that person’s:
1. management of the activities of daily living . . . ;
2. understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of any inability to manage the activities of daily
living;
3. preferences, wishes, and values with regard to managing
the activities of daily living; and
4. the nature and extent of the person’s property and finan124
cial affairs and his or her ability to manage them.

Article 81 provides further for a thorough assessment of the individual that considers the demands that the individual’s various
needs (personal, property-related, financial management) place
125
upon him or her. The statute further provides for consideration of
the presence of and prognosis associated with any physical illness or
mental disability, alcohol or substance dependence, as well as any
medications that the individual is taking and their effects on the indi126
vidual’s behavior, cognition, and judgment. The last part of section
81.02 stresses that the court shall consider “all other relevant facts
and circumstances regarding the person’s: (1) functional level; and
(2) understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences
127
of his or her functional limitations.”

124

Id. § 81.02(b)–(c). Section 81.03(h) provides: “‘[A]ctivities of daily living’
means activities such as, but not limited to, mobility, eating, toileting, dressing,
grooming, housekeeping, cooking, shopping, money management, banking, driving
or using public transportation, and other activities related to personal needs and to
property management.” Id. § 81.03(h). The commentary to this section states that
the court should look to these types of activities “to determine the person’s functional level.” Id. notes (Law Revision Comm’n Commentary).
125
Id. § 81.02(c).
126
Id.
127
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(d) (McKinney 1996). For an application of the
functional evaluation, see In re Hammons, 625 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In
this case, the Supreme Court of New York, Queens County found that, despite the
fact that the allegedly incapacitated persons suffered from no mental impairment,
Article 81’s focus on functional limitation required the court to give primary consideration to functional level and functional limitations, and to appoint a guardian
where the individuals were unable to care for themselves and their property and
were likely to suffer harm as a result. Id. at 411. The court stated that “[a]n individual’s intelligence is not a deciding factor in an article 81 proceeding.” Id. at 412.
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Article 81 of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law appears to take a
more aggressive approach to ensure that courts assess individuals subject to potential guardianship arrangements in an objective manner,
and that courts tailor the guardian’s authority to the specific needs of
128
the individual (so-called limited guardianship).
Article 81’s emphasis on functional, objective assessment is crucial to the accuracy
and appropriateness of the “front-end” of guardianship arrangements. Conversely, Article 17-A’s provisions governing incompetency
determinations resemble pre-reform efforts that merely use a label or
129
diagnosis of mental retardation as the assessment mechanism.
Such provisions are inferior to the functional and objectiveassessment provisions of Article 81, because mere labels of diagnoses
of mental disability do not necessarily provide meaningful informa130
tion about an individual’s ability to function autonomously.
Further, because the use of labels or diagnoses does not allow
for a true understanding of an individual’s functional capacities, “ar131
bitrary findings of incapacity” may result.
Evidence of actual
incapacity in specific areas of life is necessary to ensure that courts do
not deprive individuals who need some assistance of autonomy, control, or the ability to use the discretion that they are capable of
exercising. Article 17-A does in fact include a provision related to
limited guardianships (limited guardian of property); however, this
provision does not resemble Article 81’s “least restrictive form of in132
tervention” standard, and it only applies to an individual who is age
eighteen or over and “wholly or substantially self-supporting by
133
In
means of his or her wages or earnings from employment . . . .”
the case of such an individual, the limited-guardian-of-the-property
provision states that the mentally retarded person “shall have the
right to receive and expend any and all wages or other earnings of his
128

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1996).
Posner, supra note 107, at 608.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1996). Section 81.03 states that
“least restrictive form of intervention” under Article 81:
means that the powers granted by the court to the guardian with respect to the incapacitated person represent only those powers which
are necessary to provide for that person’s personal needs and/or property management and which are consistent with affording that person
the greatest amount of independence and self-determination in light
of that person’s understanding and appreciation of the nature and
consequences of his or her functional limitations.
Id. § 81.03(d).
133
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1756 (Consol. 2004).
129
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134

or her employment . . .” while the limited guardian of the property “shall receive, manage, disburse, and account for only such
property . . . as shall be received from other than the wages or earn135
Article 17-A’s limited-guardian provision is substantially
ings . . . .”
less flexible than the limited-guardianship provision in Article 81, as
it allows for significantly less individualized tailoring of the guardian’s
136
Article 17-A can benefit
authority to the ward’s specific needs.
from revisions based on the Article 81 standard.
Article 81’s “least restrictive form of intervention” standard derives from the “least restrictive alternative” doctrine established by the
137
Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker. In Shelton, the Court stated that
“even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
138
achieved.”
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit applied the doctrine in the civil commitment con139
text in Lake v. Cameron, and the New York Court of Appeals applied
140
it in the context of incapacity determinations in Rivers v. Katz.
In Rivers, the court dealt with the issue of the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to patients in a psychiatric
141
center. The patients brought an action to declare their right to refuse the drugs, and the New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court’s dismissal of the patients’ action and remanded the matter to
142
the trial court. The Court of Appeals instructed as follows:
If . . . the [trial] court concludes that the patient lacks the capacity to determine the course of his own treatment, the court must
determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to
give substantive effect to the patient’s liberty interest, taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient’s
best interests, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the
134

Id. The statute continues and places limitations on the amount of money for
which an individual can legally or contractually bind himself or herself. Id. It states
that the individual “shall have the power to contract or legally bind himself or herself
for such sum of money not exceeding one month’s wages or earnings from such employment or three hundred dollars, whichever is greater, or as otherwise authorized
by the court.” Id.
135
Id.
136
See supra notes 109–30 and accompanying text.
137
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
138
Id.
139
364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
140
495 N.E.2d 337, 339 (N.Y. 1986).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 341.
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adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less in143
trusive alternative treatments.

In Rivers, the New York Court of Appeals demonstrated a concern for
maintaining autonomy and liberty by requiring narrowly tailored
144
remedies.
Article 81 of New York’s Mental Hygiene law also ex145
presses this preference.
Article 17-A, however, grants mentally
retarded individuals substantially less protection against infringement
146
While at least one group has looked into
on individual autonomy.
the possibility of revising Article 17-A to more closely resemble Article
147
81, no current proposals exist.
V. LEGAL PROCEDURES AND LEGAL ROLES
The legal process, including encounters with judges and lawyers,
can be intimidating, overwhelming, and somewhat incomprehensible, even to adults with above-average intellectual functioning. For
those with mild cognitive impairment, a guardianship proceeding can
have serious negative effects. First, while guardianship proceedings
and the legal actors involved intend to help an individual who may be
incompetent, a challenge to an individual’s competence can have
148
negative effects on mental well-being, confidence, and morale.
Second, the behaviors and practices of judges and lawyers involved in
the guardianship proceedings can cause confusion, alienation, and
149
Furthermore, stereotypes freloss of control among participants.
quently influence judges’ and lawyers’ perceptions of, and behavior
150
If traditional stereotypes about pertoward, disabled individuals.
sons with cognitive impairment color the perceptions of judges and
lawyers, they may fail to listen to and communicate with these indi151
viduals in an appropriate manner.

143

Id. at 344.
Id.
145
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1996).
146
Id. § 81.01, Practice Commentaries by Rose Mary Bailly 248, 250.
147
Id.
148
See infra Part V.A.1.
149
See infra Part V.A.2.
150
See, e.g., Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 134 (1999). Rubinson argues that attorneys’ perceptions of
elderly clients risk being influenced by stereotypes that the elderly are forgetful, declining in competence, and senile. Id. at 134–35. Rubinson cites works by other
scholars that suggest that race, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
gender, and physical disability are also likely to impact an attorney’s view of a client.
Id. at 134 n.61 (citations omitted).
151
See, e.g., id. at 134.
144
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Both the autonomy-limiting nature of a guardianship determination and the abilities of persons with mild cognitive impairment
coalesce to create a unique opportunity to apply the principles of TJ
in order to provide optimal outcomes in guardianship determinations for persons with mild cognitive impairment. To create such
outcomes, the legal system should impose additional procedures, and
its actors should make concerted efforts to ensure that: (1) legal actors listen to and understand the needs and desires of the ward or
potential ward; and (2) learn about the nature of his or her impairment and how the impairment impacts his or her cognitive,
judgmental, and other capacities. While seemingly simplistic, the
ability of judges and lawyers to listen to the desires and needs of individuals has been linked to increased satisfaction with legal
152
outcomes.
A. The “Front-End”: Determining Incompetency
The importance of participation, accuracy, and objectivity at the
“front-end” of guardianship is crucial to the success of the guardianship arrangement.
If an individual is not appropriately and
objectively assessed to determine abilities, desires, and preferences,
the guardianship arrangement is likely to be ill-suited to the individ153
ual’s needs.
Even under progressive guardianship regimes, like
New York’s Mental Hygiene Law Article 81, which mandate evidence
154
of actual incapacity prior to a determination of incapacity, there is
room for improvement. Principles of TJ can provide assistance in this
area.
1.

The Psychology of Guardianships of Persons with Mild
Cognitive Impairment: Effects of Incompetency
Labeling and Restrictions on Autonomy

First, legal actors must understand that a legal determination of
incompetency or incapacity can have a devastating personal and emo155
tional impact on the individual deemed incompetent.
Bruce
Winick observes:
Labeling individuals as incompetent usually has the effect of
removing their ability to make decisions for themselves, at least in
152

Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 309, 309–10; see infra Part
V.A.2.
153
See supra text accompanying notes 107–09.
154
See supra text accompanying notes 116–28.
155
Winick, supra note 13, at 26.
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the particular area in which their capacity is thought to be lacking. Individuals considered to be incompetent find that their
choices and preferences are ignored and that others make
choices for them. They often are treated as objects, rather than as
people. As a result, events in their lives are perceived to be outside of their control. They are treated as children, subject to the
156
authority, even if benevolently intended, of others.

For persons with mild cognitive impairment, the impact of unnecessary infringements on personal autonomy can be particularly
devastating. Because individuals in this group tend to have various
intellectual and practical abilities, even a narrowly tailored guardianship arrangement can have the effect of undermining the individual’s
confidence and morale, both in the area or areas in which the individual is deemed incompetent, as well as in the areas still left to the
157
individual’s discretion.
While the arrangement may in fact be appropriate and necessary and is intended to help the individual, it can
have a negative effect, especially if the incompetency label is attributed to an area that is important to the individual’s self-concept or
158
identity.
Further, researchers have found that labels of incompetency can
create feelings of powerlessness and loss of control, the most serious
159
of which is the phenomenon of learned helplessness.
Individuals
who are deemed incompetent may begin to feel that their actions
160
cannot influence outcomes, and, thus, they feel a loss of control. If
individuals attribute the inability to control outcomes to immutable
personal limitations, they may feel unable to meaningfully contribute
to any decisions. This feeling of loss of control can wreak havoc on
self-esteem, motivation, and morale, while causing the individual to
feel that his or her inability is a personal failure that affects all areas
161
This can cause the
of functioning and that will always be present.
individual to stop trying to exert influence, or to become more pas162
sive, in their attempts to control their own lives.
Such a result

156

Id.
Id. at 26–27.
158
See, e.g., EDWARD E. JONES ET AL., SOCIAL STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKED
RELATIONSHIPS 116 (1984).
159
See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 10.; Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in
Humans: An Attributional Analysis, in HUMAN HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
3 (Judy Garber & Martin E.P. Seligman eds., Academic Press, Inc. 1980).
160
Winick, supra note 13, at 29.
161
Id. at 29–30.
162
Id.
157

MCMANUS 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 4:29:05 PM

COMMENT

613

demonstrates how a seemingly protective law or system can have un163
intended and unfortunate effects.
Recent research further affirms the importance of perceptions
164
of control amongst persons with mild cognitive impairment.
Researchers assessed stress, coping strategies, perceptions of control,
and psychological distress in a sample of eighty-eight adults with mild
165
The researchers found that the subjects
cognitive impairment.
were most likely to use the most desirable method of coping with
166
stress, active coping, in stressful situations appraised as controlla167
The researchers concluded that “this may mean that attempts
ble.
to foster effective coping among people with mild mental retardation
168
are contingent upon increasing perceptions of control.”
While not all persons with mild cognitive impairment who are
placed under some form of guardianship arrangement experience
feelings of loss of control or learned helplessness, it is important for
legal actors to recognize and understand the effects of the incompetency or incapacity determination on the psychological state of the
individual. The drug and mental health courts provide insights into
169
ways to minimize the negative effects of such a determination.
2.

Minimizing Anti-Therapeutic Consequences at the
“Front-End”: Using Social Science to Inform Legal
Actors

Legal actors can seek to minimize the negative impact and increase the accuracy of incompetency determinations in several ways.
To do this, legal actors must increase their knowledge about persons
with mild cognitive impairment and must also develop a greater understanding of their own beliefs about this population. First, judges
must realize that their status as authority figures may have strong effects on the individuals they deem incompetent, perhaps increasing

163

Id. at 17–18.
Hartley & MacLean, supra note 100, at 294.
165
Id. at 287–88.
166
For the purposes of this research, active coping was defined as “efforts aimed at
gaining control over the stressful situation or over one’s emotions.” Id. at 286.
Other methods of coping with stress that were assessed in this study were “distraction
coping,” defined as “efforts aimed to distract from the stressful situation through
positive thoughts and positive activities,” and “avoidant coping,” defined as “efforts
aimed at avoiding or disengaging from the stressful situation or one’s emotional experience.” Id.
167
Id. at 294.
168
Id.
169
See supra text accompanying notes 33–57.
164
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the tendency for the individuals to feel that they are completely inca170
pable in the areas of life for which a judge appoints a guardian.
Second, while objectivity is a hallmark of most judicial decisionmaking, stereotypes about people with cognitive impairment may influence even judges. Because of this possibility, judges can benefit
from specialized training and education about the unique needs and
171
abilities of persons with mild cognitive impairment. In fact, a monitoring study conducted by the American Bar Association
recommended that courts “designate certain judges to be responsible
172
for guardianship hearings and review procedures.”
Just as drug-court judges become well versed on the topics of
173
addiction and rehabilitation, and mental-health-court judges be174
come intimately familiar with mental disorders and treatment, it is
important for judges who take part in guardianship proceedings to
familiarize themselves with the unique abilities of persons with mild
cognitive impairment and with the psychological consequences that a
judge’s rather routine decision-making can have on individuals subject to guardianship arrangements. With this knowledge, judges can
transform their behaviors when dealing with this population.
In keeping with the drug-court model, judges presiding over
guardianships should depart from the traditional adjudicative approach characterized by “disinterest, impartiality, passivity, and
175
restraint,” and instead should become proactive in their interactions with wards with mild cognitive impairment to ensure the least
176
For
restrictive and most appropriate guardianship arrangement.
instance, judges should make sincere efforts to understand the impact of an individual’s mild cognitive impairment on that individual’s
177
Judges should tailor their speech—its content,
actual abilities.
speed, and level of sophistication—to the needs of the individual and
should attempt to clearly explain the reasoning behind any determinations to the individual, rather than solely to the lawyer or the
170

Winick, supra note 13, at 31.
See infra text accompanying notes 187–93.
172
SALLY BALCH HURME, STEPS TO ENHANCE GUARDIANSHIP MONITORING 10–11
(1991).
173
See NOLAN, supra note 37, at 135–38.
174
See Kondo, supra note 50, at 292–93.
175
NOLAN, supra note 37, at 92.
176
Id. at 94. Nolan discusses how the “drug court judge deliberately departs from
the kind of passive role Tocqueville saw as a defining quality of the American judiciary.” Id.
177
Such efforts are consistent with a focus on a functional evaluation of an individual. See supra text accompanying notes 107–09.
171
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guardian. The judge should also encourage the ward’s active participation during the hearing.
All of these behaviors will likely reduce the intimidation or insecurity that a hearing and interaction with an authoritative judicial
figure may engender in an individual subject to a guardianship proceeding. Further, such active participation by the judge may increase
178
the individual’s satisfaction with the overall result of the hearing.
Bruce Winick, a founder of the TJ movement, summarizes the empirical studies in this area in the following passage:
Litigants highly value the process or dignitary value of a hearing.
People who feel they have been treated fairly at the hearing, with
respect and dignity and in good faith, experience greater litigant
satisfaction than those who feel treated unfairly, with disrespect,
and in bad faith. People highly value “voice,” the ability to tell
their story, and “validation,” the feeling that what they have had
to say was taken seriously by the judge or other decision-maker.
When people are treated these ways at a hearing, they are often
satisfied with the result even if it is adverse to them, and comply
more readily with the outcome of the hearing. Moreover, they
experience the results of the proceeding as less coercive than
when these conditions are violated, and even feel that they have
voluntarily chosen the course that is judicially imposed. Such
feelings of voluntariness rather than coercion tend to produce
179
more effective behavior on their part.

Lawyers can also play a role in increasing the overall positive
outcome of a guardianship proceeding. Research in the field of cognitive psychology suggests that lawyers who take an active approach in
explaining elements and aspects of the legal process to their clients
180
can reduce the stress experienced by the client.
The client’s reduced stress may be attributed to having information that enables
him or her to adjust expectations “in a realistic way and to prepare
181
Like judges, lawyers
emotionally to meet the challenges ahead.”
must adjust their language to meet the needs of a mildly cognitively
impaired client. Also like judges, lawyers should assume a more active posture when dealing with a client with mild cognitive
impairment; they should attempt to converse with their clients in a
178

See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (citing studies that found disputants’ judgments about
procedural justice affect perceptions of substantive justice as well as disputants’
evaluations of authorities and institutions).
179
Winick, supra note 152, at 320–21.
180
See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 203 (1984).
181
Winick, supra note 152, at 313.
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manner that demonstrates their sincere desire to attain the best outcome possible.
Another influential actor in this setting is the guardian ad litem
(GAL). Many states provide for court appointment of an independent third party to investigate the circumstances and assess the needs
of an alleged disabled person, to safeguard the procedural rights of
182
an alleged disabled person, and to advocate on the person’s behalf.
183
The GAL is often a lawyer, but not always. The GAL can play a vital
role in assuring that the court understands the abilities and needs of
184
the person with mild cognitive impairment. The GAL is a uniquely
situated actor, because of his or her extended or in-depth contact
185
with the person subject to a potential guardianship.
The GAL is
also more objective than a proposed guardian’s attorney, because the
proposed guardian—usually a parent—may be more likely to over186
Further, as an
emphasize the limitations of the proposed ward.
advocate, a GAL can play a crucial role in preventing “rubberstamping” of guardianship applications and can urge the judge to
undertake a more thorough inquiry into the needs and abilities of
proposed wards. To effectuate this, a GAL should receive specialized
training about the abilities and needs of persons with mild cognitive
impairment. Also, as discussed below, a GAL must also acknowledge
any beliefs or stereotypes about persons with cognitive impairment
that are in conflict with his or her role as advocate.
Clearly, in order to create optimal outcomes for this population,
legal actors must increase their knowledge and awareness about persons with mild cognitive impairment. Increasing awareness, however,
does not end there. In fact, legal actors must make efforts to increase
self-awareness about stereotypes they may hold concerning persons
with mild cognitive impairment. Judges, lawyers, guardians, and
GALs must acknowledge stereotypes they likely hold about persons
with cognitive impairment, and they must not allow these stereotypes
to color their perceptions of the abilities of the individual. By definition, a stereotype is “a generalized (sometimes accurate but often
182

SCOTT K. SUMMERS, GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS 51–52 (1996).
183
Id. at 51.
184
Id. at 52 (“The involvement of a GAL . . . probably is the single best assurance
that an alleged disabled person will be accorded full due process rights.”).
185
Id.
186
Id. (suggesting that family members keep a “respectful distance” from the GAL
and “cooperate fully with all requests for information” so as to maintain the objectivity of the GAL and the privacy of the conversations between the GAL and proposed
ward).
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overgeneralized) belief about a group of people.”
Research in the
field of cognitive psychology has demonstrated that stereotyped beliefs are rooted in categorization and the need to simplify the
188
world.
While categorization may aid information processing, it fre189
quently also “biases our perceptions of diversity.”
This is
particularly dangerous when legal actors, such as judges and lawyers,
interact with persons with cognitive impairment. Research has shown
that people tend to view themselves, and those in their groups (e.g.,
their racial group), as possessing more individuality and diversity
190
People also tend to
than those in groups other than their own.
overestimate the similarity of those in groups dissimilar to their
191
own.
Such research is informative in the legal setting because it is
likely that many judges and lawyers consider themselves distinct from
other segments of the population, due to their education level and
the prestige associated with the legal profession. Assuming this to be
true, judges and lawyers as a group may feel particularly different
192
from those with cognitive impairments.
Therefore, they may be
more likely to view these persons as similar in abilities and capacity,
193
Such stereotypes may
despite differences in level of impairment.
result in an inappropriate assessment of incompetency and have the
potential to affect the integrity of the overall guardianship arrangement.
The “front-end” of guardianship also involves the appointment
194
To follow a TJ model, the court must appoint a
of a guardian.
guardian based on an accurate and informed determination of incompetency while ensuring that the ward is agreeable to the choice
of guardian. Ensuring the ward’s agreement with the choice of
guardian is typically not an issue, as the law of most states presumes
that the guardian will be a close family member. Despite this pre187

MYERS, supra note 9, at 695.
Id. at 697.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 697–98.
191
Id.
192
See generally JACQUES-PHILIPPE LEYENS ET AL., STEREOTYPES AND SOCIAL COGNITION
107 (1994) (discussing empirical support for the theory that “people hold a more
complex representation of the ingroup than of the outgroup”).
193
This conclusion is an application of research findings in the area of race and
its effects on categorization and stereotyping. See Robert K. Bothwell et al., Crossracial Identification, in PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 15, 19–25
(March 1989).
194
Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 867. This Comment will not deal in great
length with this aspect of the “front-end.”
188
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sumption, a TJ perspective cautions against placing unquestioned
faith in the presumed family guardian. As one author noted on the
issue of elder autonomy, “[i]n . . . situations of shared authority between the family and the individual, especially in a home
environment, the erosion of autonomy may be incremental rather
than sudden, and the mundane nature of most decisions may camouflage this loss as it occurs. The loss of autonomy is real nonethe195
less . . . .” This insight applies with equal force to guardianships involving persons with mild cognitive impairment, and it counsels in
favor of enhanced accountability and monitoring—even when a
guardian is the parent or other close relative of the ward.
B. The “Back-End”: Accountability and Monitoring
The “back-end” of guardianship arrangements involves guardian
196
Acaccountability and monitoring of guardianship arrangements.
cording to two well-known guardianship scholars, “[t]he key to the
197
quality of guardianship monitoring is the judge.” They state that:
[T]he judge often has wide latitude in shaping court practices in
guardian oversight. The judge may determine how frequently reports are filed in jurisdictions that allow discretion, what the
reports should look like, what assistance guardians will have in
preparation of the report, how the reports will be tracked and reviewed, whether investigators will follow up on “red flag” items,
whether sanctions will be imposed, how the complaint process will
be handled, and whether funds will be sought for resources moni198
toring.

Other commentators have likewise substantiated the importance of the role of the judge to the “back-end” of guardianship. One
commentator writes that “[o]nly when judges become acculturated to
the existing reforms, and only when they internalize the values em199
Clearly,
bedded in those reforms, will guardianship truly change.”
judges are crucially important figures at the “back end” of guardianship.
First, in order to improve judicial monitoring of the guardian to
hold the guardian accountable for any abuses or other breaches in
the guardian’s fiduciary duty to a ward, judges must educate them195

Marshall B. Kapp, Who’s the Parent Here? The Family’s Impact on the Autonomy of
Older Persons, 41 EMORY L.J. 773, 777 (1992).
196
Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 867.
197
Id. at 914.
198
Id. at 914–15.
199
Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 355 (1998).
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selves about the importance of efforts to ensure ward safety and to
prevent unnecessary infringements on autonomy. Judges must fully
perceive the guardianship determination, and the appointment of a
guardian, as only the first steps in a guardianship proceeding. The
nature and quality of judicial involvement in drug and mental health
200
courts is instructive on this point. Some drug-court judges have become involved in the lives of “clients” outside of the courtroom,
201
contacting employers and becoming involved in community efforts.
Such behavior provides a positive message to guardians, wards, and
the community at large.
Second, the designation of a specialized judge for guardianship
hearings and review procedures is certainly beneficial because “of the
specialized nature of cases involving incapacitated persons,” and the
judge’s “need to be familiar with the complexities of case management and surrogate decision-making for individuals with complicated
202
mental and medical problems.”
Finally, guardian education and training and community and
public awareness about guardianship arrangements can also help to
ensure that guardianship arrangements provide optimal benefits to
203
wards. Devising guardianship training and education requirements
204
is difficult, and depends largely on the needs of each individual
ward. However, judges should assume a leadership role and take it
upon themselves to narrowly tailor statutory requirements regarding
guardian accountability and monitoring to fit the needs of each individual.
Particularly in arrangements involving persons with mild cognitive impairments, judges should explore the possibility of
modification orders in the event the scope of the existing guardian205
Frequently,
ship arrangement is no longer appropriate.
modification orders are made to widen the scope of a guardian’s discretion and power over a ward, but judges should be cognizant of the
possibility for contraction of guardian powers in cases involving persons with mild cognitive impairment. This is due to the fact that

200

See NOLAN, supra note 37, at 94–95.
Id. at 95–97.
202
Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 917.
203
Id. at 877, 918, 920.
204
Id. at 877.
205
See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1755 (Consol. 2004). This statute provides
for a modification order to modify the guardianship arrangement in the interest of
protecting the mentally retarded person’s “financial situation and/or his or her personal interests.” Id.
201
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persons with mild cognitive impairment may experience increases in
206
adaptive functioning.
According to the DSM-IV, “[a]daptive functioning may be influenced by various factors, including education, motivation, personality
characteristics, social and vocational opportunities, and the mental
disorders and general medical conditions that may coexist with Men207
tal Retardation.”
The DSM-IV further states that “[p]roblems in
adaptation are more likely to improve with remedial efforts than is
208
the cognitive IQ, which tends to remain a more stable attribute.”
Adaptive functioning is conceptually indistinguishable from the notion of functionalism that is assessed in incompetency determi209
Therefore, judges should be aware of the potential for
nations.
improvement in the ward’s abilities and the possibility of contracting
the guardian’s power.
Community and public awareness efforts are also important in
that they can foster social awareness about guardianship monitoring.
As one commentator states: “if the community knows what guardians
210
Furare supposed to do, guardians may be more likely to do it.”
ther, efforts to inform the community about guardianship
arrangements may function to dispel stereotypes by promoting understanding about the capacities and needs of persons with cognitive
impairment.
VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Proponents of the TJ movement study “the role of the law as a
211
therapeutic agent.”
A major criticism leveled against TJ is that it is
212
inappropriate for legal actors to engage in “therapeutic” activity.
Further, proponents of “therapeutic” processes and justice must ad213
dress the obvious issues of cost and inefficiency.

206

DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 42. Adaptive functioning is a psychological term of
art used in the DSM-IV to refer to “how effectively individuals cope with common life
demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence expected
of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community
setting.” Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See supra Part IV for a discussion of Article 81’s functional assessment.
210
Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 920.
211
Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at xvii.
212
Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2072.
213
See, e.g., Hurme and Wood, supra note 62, at 883 (discussing cost as a barrier to
implementing guardianship reforms).
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A major criticism of TJ principles involves the “therapeutic”
214
practice of law by judges and other legal actors.
One critic, the
Honorable Morris Hoffman, expresses concern that the “new thera215
peutic judges” take on the role of “amateur therapists.”
Another
critic, Professor John Petrila, contends that “the assumption that lawyers and mental health professionals should act in concert to identify
and promote therapeutic values as one of the core functions of the
216
While the concerns of
legal system” needs “critical examination.”
Judge Hoffman and Professor Petrila are understandable, a judge’s
concern that an outcome that he or she devises be effective and appropriate is less akin to an attempt to be an “amateur therapist” and
more indicative of an attempt to create a fair and effective remedy.
Further, the notion of therapeutic processes should not bring to
mind clichéd visions of troubled patients lying on couches. Instead,
one should recognize therapeutic processes as attempts to utilize ad217
vances in social science and law to create optimal outcomes.
Perhaps some of the doubts surrounding the TJ movement as a
proper legal movement stem from an unwillingness to recognize that
judges should incorporate aspects of social science into the practice
218
Or, perhaps
of law. But judges do this in many areas of the law.
the idea of “soft” social science used in conjunction with “hard” legal
principles is disconcerting and considered dangerous to the proper
219
administration of justice.
Judge Hoffman offered his criticisms in the context of the TJ
220
movement’s relation to the drug-court movement. Judge Hoffman
writes:
Drug courts are the most visible, but by no means the only, judicial expression of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement. The
idea that judges should be in the business of treating the psyches
of the people who appear before them is taking hold not only in

214

Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2072.
Id.
216
John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at 685, 696.
217
Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at xvii (“[TJ] is an interdisciplinary enterprise designed to produce scholarship that is particularly useful
for law reform.”).
218
For perhaps the most well-known example of the use of social science research
in legal proceedings, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). In
Brown, the Supreme Court relied upon research that found segregation had a destructive psychological impact on black children. Id. at 494–95.
219
See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2063–65.
220
Id. at 2067.
215
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drug courts but in a host of other criminal and even civil set221
tings.

Judge Hoffman considers the idea of “therapeutic judges” to be
222
dangerous for several reasons.
His primary criticism is that judges
that employ principles of TJ are “amateur therapists but have the
powers of real judges” and that these judges “act in concert with each
other, their communities, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and the selfinterested therapeutic cottage industry, contrary to the fundamental
223
principle of judicial independence.”
To the extent that Judge
Hoffman’s opposition to the TJ movement and its embodiment in
drug courts is related to his resistance to the disease model of addiction and his belief that drug courts undermine the retributive goals
224
of the criminal justice system, it is inapposite to a critique of a
therapeutic approach to guardianship proceedings and arrangements.
Judge Hoffman’s concern that “therapeutic” judges act as “amateur therapists” is somewhat overstated. While Judge Hoffman
applies this argument primarily in the drug-court setting, he also expresses concern about the use of TJ principles in other settings,
225
including civil settings.
Judge Hoffman’s belief that judges will act
as “amateur therapists” ignores the reality that judges that preside
over mental health or guardianship cases will consult with and be advised by expert witnesses—such as psychiatrists and psychologists—
226
and will form a judgment based on input from these specialists.
Thus, these judges are not acting as would-be psychiatrists; rather
they are participating in a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding complex issues. Further, model judges—be they in drug courts
or in mental health courts, or presiding over guardianship proceedings and arrangements—will be intimately familiar with issues of
addiction, mental illness, and the effects of cognitive impairment on
227
behavior, respectively. Fears of judges acting beyond the bounds of
their authority and competency are exaggerated because judicial discretion is appropriately constrained, and so-called judicial activism is
nothing more than a willingness to address problems holistically.

221

Id.
Id. at 2072.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 2067–68, 2075–76.
225
Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2067.
226
See, e.g., Kondo, supra note 50, at 293.
227
Id. at 287 (discussing the unique qualifications necessary for the position of
mental health court judge).
222
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Professor Petrila’s criticisms of the TJ movement, as they apply
to the applications of TJ to guardianship proceedings, include the
following:
Significantly, Essays [a collection of essays authored by the founders of TJ which explore applications of TJ principles] fails to
question who decides what represents a therapeutic outcome. Instead, Essays simply assumes that research scientists and lawyers
will decide whether a particular legal rule or intervention has
therapeutic value. People treated voluntarily or coercively by
mental health professionals and subject to legal rules governing
the conditions and terms of that treatment are largely ignored.
As a result, people who can provide the best information about
the therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences of legal/therapeutic interventions are excluded from participating in
the analysis of what is or is not in their interest. Therapeutic jurisprudence as it has been conceptualized to date is a
conservative, arguably paternalistic, approach to mental disability
228
law.

The argument that TJ largely ignores those whom it is intended
to help is inimical to the very nature of the movement. Principles of
TJ have been applied to better understand addiction, mental illness,
and mental capacity in order to best serve the interests of persons
whose lives intersect with the legal system due to drugs, mental illness, or some type of incapacity. It is in this capacity that the TJ
movement seeks to enhance therapeutic consequences and reduce
anti-therapeutic consequences, all without “subordinating due proc229
ess and other justice values.”
Within the guardianship setting, TJ principles encourage legal
actors to recognize the importance of the participation of a mildly
cognitively impaired ward in the guardianship arena. Further, empirical research suggests that active participation in legal proceedings
230
increases satisfaction with outcomes.
Certainly increased satisfaction is a “therapeutic outcome” that incorporates the experience of
the person subject to legal processes. While not without force, Professor Petrila’s criticisms of the TJ movement are not persuasive in
the guardianship context.
Other criticisms of the TJ movement involve time and cost considerations. Certainly, involving judges, lawyers, guardians, and wards
to the extent suggested in this Comment will sacrifice efficiency in

228
229
230

Petrila, supra note 216, at 688.
Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at xvii.
See generally LIND & TYLER, supra note 178.
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guardianship proceedings. Further, training and education efforts
231
for legal actors, guardians, and wards require time and money.
Some have suggested cutting costs through practical training solu232
tions for new guardians using existing community resources. These
suggestions could apply with equal force to training for judges and
lawyers.
Economic and efficiency arguments in the guardianship setting
are powerful. However, the legal community must remain mindful of
the very essence of guardianship as an institution that sacrifices individual autonomy. Such arrangements require careful scrutiny and an
active legal system in order to ensure that they are appropriate and
carefully tailored. Many persons with mild cognitive impairment
need the assistance of a guardian; these people also need to retain
autonomy and control in areas of their lives in which they are competent and capable. A justice system that is informed by principles of TJ
will better serve this population.
VII. CONCLUSION
Guardianship arrangements involving persons with mild cognitive impairment present a unique opportunity in which the principles
of TJ can be applied to improve the “front-end” and “back-end” of
233
Persons with mild
guardianship proceedings and arrangements.
cognitive impairment are capable of so much, yet likely need assistance in some areas of their lives. The application of TJ principles in
this context illuminates important areas of concern, such as appro234
priate assessment based on objective, functional methodologies.
Further application of TJ principles in this setting can ultimately improve the quality of life for many persons in need of some form of
guardianship arrangement by allowing for more control and partici235
The key to overcoming
pation in the guardianship process.
systemic discrimination and misunderstanding is to make legal actors,
legislators, and the public see persons with mild cognitive impairment as more like them, and less like a distant “other.” A TJ
approach, informed by social science, can help this process. Finally,
approaching guardianship using a TJ lens need not raise concerns
231

Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 883 (discussing examples of cost as a substantial barrier to training).
232
Id. at 884 (citing the use of community resources, such as guardianship agencies and associations, as a way to reduce costs associated with training).
233
See supra Parts V.A–B.
234
See supra Part IV.
235
See supra Parts V.A–B.
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about inappropriate judicial activism or the “unlicensed practice” of
236
psychology by judicial actors, but, rather, it should be viewed as a
comprehensive and integrative approach to guardianship arrangements involving a uniquely situated group of individuals.

236

See supra Part VI.

